

Regulating Lobbyists: A Comparative Analysis of the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union

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Introduction and objectives

LOBBYING is a central and legitimate part of the democratic process in all political systems. Although the term has often been associated with negative connotations, the work of lobbyists is essential. Such actors engage in the provision of input, and feedback, to the political system, thereby helping to develop policy outputs. Lobby groups may include those with economic interests (corporations), professional interests (trade unions or representatives of a professional society) and civil society interests (such as environmental groups). These groups may seek to influence political decisions by many means, including direct communications with governmental officials, presentations and telephone conversations.

Notwithstanding the importance of lobby/interest groups, only four political systems in the world have regulations with regard to lobbying activity: the United States, Canada, Germany and the European Union (most particularly, the European Parliament). 'Regulations' refer to 'rules', which interest groups must follow when pursuing lobbying activity, including registering with the state before contact can be made with any public official. It is oftentimes assumed that regulation of interest group activities offers several advantages to the political system. These include increased accountability and transparency, as well as diminishing loopholes in the system,

which would otherwise allow for corrupt behaviour. In this regard, schemes to regulate lobbying derive from concerns over the democratic deficit, the openness and transparency of government, equality of access to public affairs, and the perceived need to manage information flows to and from governments.¹

We turn first to the United States. In the 1930s, Congress enacted legislation in response to a number of scandals concerning the lobbying of public utility companies and the maritime industry. However, these regulations were perceived as inadequate. The Lobbying Act 1946 (federal) thus sought 'to disclose to the legislators and the public the identity of the principals, representatives, and the means involved, to make the free play of legislative interest transparent'.² In other words, the registration of lobbyists 'should at least work in the direction of greater transparency'.³ However, this Act, hurriedly drafted, contained numerous loopholes. Since publicity was considered important in diminishing bad lobbying practices, critics claimed that the statute provided inadequate publicity for the activities of pressure groups.⁴ As Wolpe and Levine's data shows, 'a 1991 General Accounting Office report found that fewer than 4,000 of the 13,500 individuals listed in a directory of Washington lobbyists were registered'.⁵ It took a half a century for the 1946 Act to be replaced by the Lobbying Disclosures Act in 1995, which increased the reporting requirements of lobbying organisations. This

law extended the definition of lobbyists to include those that lobby directly, as well as those that hire lobbying firms.⁶ All states, except Pennsylvania, have individual lobbying legislation. Pennsylvania did have legislation, the 1998 Lobbying Disclosure Act, but this was struck down in 2000 by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, as it pertains to attorneys, with the court saying the General Assembly of Pennsylvania's efforts to monitor the activities of lobbyists amounted to illegal regulations on the practice of law. This invalidated the law. In 2002, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reaffirmed its decision.

In Canada, consensus developed among politicians that legislation requiring the registration of lobbyists was necessary to promote transparency and accountability.⁷ The federal level was first to pursue lobbying legislation in 1989, by way of the Lobbyist Registration Act (Canada). The 1989 Act was amended in 1995 with the Amendment to Lobbyist Registration Act, which sought to beef up the information requirements to be forwarded by lobbyists when registering. The final major amendment to the federal Act came with Bill C-15 in 2003 (enforced in 2005), which sought to close loopholes in the previous system with regard to definitions of 'lobbying'. Following from the federal lead, the provinces of Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, British Columbia (BC) and most recently Newfoundland enacted lobbying legislation. Proponents of Canadian regulations identified two beneficiaries—the public and government officials—where the acts have 'thrown light on the activities of professional lobbyists in Canada'.⁸ Despite this, some critics contend that the legislation is weak compared to US laws.⁹

The German Bundestag is currently the only parliament in Europe that has adopted formal rules on registration of lobbyists, and those wishing to lobby either the Bundestag or the federal government, or both, must register on this

public list to promote transparency. In principle, lobbyists cannot be heard by parliamentary committees, or be issued with a pass admitting them to parliamentary buildings, unless they are on the register. This system was first regulated in the Rules of Procedure of the Bundestag in 1951, through Article 73, which referred to participation by associations. It was subsequently amended on two further occasions, in 1975 and 1980, which indicated an increased use of the hearings system.¹⁰ The Bundestag can, however, also invite organisations that are not on the register to present information on an *ad hoc* basis. In essence, this means that not being on the register is no real barrier to being in contact with parliamentary committees or members of the Bundestag. The Bundestag makes quite clear that consulting with interest groups and professional associations is crucial when drafting legislation. Article 77, paragraph (1) of the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany provides for legislative bills to be adopted by the Bundestag. The Bundestag is of the view that many people should participate in the substantive elaboration of bills, but responsibility for enacting bills must be assumed by those elected for this purpose, hence the nature of invitations to those not on any register.

Even though the size of the interest group population in Brussels raises concerns over equality of access to, and the ethical standards of, European decision-making, the only EU institution that has lobbying regulations is the European Parliament.¹¹ The debate on lobbying, linked to the issue of transparency in EU institutions, began in 1992 with the report of Marc Galle MEP, and was followed in 1996 by the report of Glynn Ford MEP. However, apart from minimalist regulations adopted, there was insufficient support for the idea that in exchange for the annual renewal of their entry passes, lobbyists should provide detailed reports of their efforts to influence the

Parliament's decision-making process. In contrast to the European Parliament (EP), the Commission has continued to favour self-regulation of interests, despite traditionally being the primary target of lobbyists in Brussels.¹²

Despite the many works that have offered individual country analysis of development of lobbying legislation, there is a twofold void in the literature. First, no study has offered a comparative analysis that classifies the types of laws in these four political systems. This will allow for better understanding of the different regulatory environments one finds in this issue area. Secondly, few studies have analysed what are the views of key agents involved in the process, including politicians, lobbyists and regulators, and how these compare and contrast across different regulatory environments.

The objective of this article is twofold. First, we will use a quantitative index to measure how strong or weak the regulations are in each system, allowing us to devise a classification scheme of the different 'ideal' types of regulatory environments. We will argue that the three ideal types are lowly, medium and strongly regulated systems. Secondly, we will measure the opinion of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems (as measured through questionnaires and elite interviews) and see what correlations, if any, one can draw between the different ideal types of systems and their opinions. We will argue that actors in highly regulated systems claim to know more about legislation, are more likely to argue that accountability is ensured, and feel that there are fewer loopholes in the system than those respondents from lower regulated systems. Nevertheless, even in relatively highly regulated systems, the regulations can be undermined under the 'if there is a will, there is always a way' principle.

Rating regulation—regulatory environment ideal types

There are two measures of rigour in the literature that measure how lobbying is regulated in the US. The first is Opheim's rating of the stringency of lobbying regulation in 47 states.¹³ Opheim's index consists of 22 separately scored items drawn from three different dimensions of lobbying regulation requirements. The dimensions were: (1) statutory definitions of a lobbyist (seven items); (2) frequency and quality of disclosure (eight items); and (3) oversight and enforcement of regulations (seven items). The values of the index range from a low of zero for Arkansas to a high of 18 for New Jersey, Washington and Wisconsin. The second measure is Brinig et al.'s rating of the restrictiveness of state lobbying laws.¹⁴ Rather than offer explicit coding schemes, their work highlights specific examples. They consider the frequency with which lobbyists are required to register and report, and their scheme emphasises the severity of penalties for violations of lobbying laws. The values of the index range from a low of 1 for Arkansas to a high of 14 for Alabama and Kentucky.

An extension of this method of analysis has been pursued by the Center for Public Integrity (CPI), which has analysed the 50 US jurisdictions with such lobbying legislation (the federal level and 49 states that have legislation) and measured the legislations' effectiveness. The detailed process of analysis is referred to as the 'Hired Guns' method, which results in a 'CPI score'. The CPI writes:

Hired Guns' is an analysis of lobby disclosure laws in all 50 states. The Center for Public Integrity created a ranking system that assigns a score to each state (with lobbying legislation) based on a survey containing a series of questions regarding state lobby disclosure. The questions addressed eight key areas of disclosure for state lobbyists and the organisations that put them to work:

- Definition of Lobbyist
- Individual Registration
- Individual Spending Disclosure
- Employer Spending Disclosure
- Electronic Filing
- Public Access (to a registry of lobbyists)
- Enforcement and
- Revolving Door Provisions (with a particular focus on 'cooling off periods')¹⁵

Appendix A, which offers an example of the CPI's examination of Washington State, shows how the CPI extends on Opheim's model by considering 48 questions in its eight sections.

In fact, the CPI's index goes well beyond the extent of Opheim's work by looking at individual lobbyist registration, electronic filing, public access and revolving door provisions. On one level, this broader examination of lobbying regulations is a natural product of time and technological development. Electronic filing of returns by lobbyists, and public Internet access to detailed databases of lobbyists, was far in the future in 1991. But, on another level, the CPI's framework is more thorough than Opheim's, in that it examines the issues of individual lobbying registration, public access to a directory of lobbyists and the revolving door provisions, which Opheim bypassed. Thus, in expanding upon the range of lobbying regulations studied by Opheim, and setting out 48 separately scored items, as opposed to Opheim's 22, the CPI's framework constitutes a broader, and deeper, approach to analysing the rigour with which states regulate lobbies.

That the CPI's framework was designed for examining lobbying regulations in the US should not render it inapplicable to other jurisdictions. As the framework is capable of taking account of the widely varying standards of lobbying regulation across all 50 American states, and at the federal level, it should also be capable of taking account of lobbying regulations in other countries. The very thoroughness of the framework makes it analytically encompassing.

Based on analysis of the legislation, each question is assigned a numerical (i.e. point) value according to the answer given. The more points that are given, the 'better' the legislation in terms of promoting concepts such as full disclosure, public access and transparency. The maximum score a jurisdiction could attain is 100 points, the minimum 1 point (a score of zero would be given to a state with no lobbying legislation). According to the CPI, if a jurisdiction attains a score of 60 points or more, it is deemed to 'pass', based on the grading system used in American schools. Regardless of the somewhat arbitrary rule of what constitutes a 'passing grade', as a general rule one can argue that the lower the CPI score, the less robust are the lobbying regulations in place.

To gain comparative insights, we transfer the CPI method to analysing lobbying legislation in Canada, Germany and the European Parliament. As an objective here is to offer a comparative analysis of the lobbying legislation in place in four political systems, it was felt that, given its robustness and detailed method of analysis, application of the CPI methodology would allow for greater insights with regard to how the different countries studied compared and contrasted to each other, and how this could be theoretically classified. For illustrative purposes, Appendix A also shows how the CPI scores for Canadian federal lobbying legislation and German lobbying legislation were calculated by this research team. As in the previous example of Washington State, point values are assigned to each of the 48 questions.

With the above in mind, we applied the CPI method of analysis to all other jurisdictions where lobbying legislation exists, including the state and provincial levels in the US and Canada, respectively. Because all Länder level legislation is similar to the German federal legislation, only the German federal level is reported.

Table 1: CPI scores for the USA,^a Canada, Germany and the European Parliament

Jurisdiction	CPI score	Jurisdiction	CPI score
Washington*	87	Montana	56
Kentucky	79	Delaware	56
Connecticut	75	Arkansas	56
South Carolina	75	Louisiana	55
New York*	74	Florida*	55
Massachusetts	73	Oregon	55
Wisconsin	73	Vermont	54
California*	71	Hawaii	54
Utah	70	Idaho	53
Maryland	68	Nevada	53
Ohio	67	Alabama	52
Indiana	66	West Virginia	52
Texas*	66	Newfoundland	48
New Jersey	65	Iowa	47
Mississippi	65	Oklahoma	47
Alaska	64	North Dakota	46
Virginia	64	Canada federal	45
Kansas	63	Illinois*	45
Georgia*	63	Tennessee	45
Minnesota	62	South Dakota	42
Missouri	61	British Columbia	44
Michigan	61	Ontario	43
Nebraska	61	Quebec	40
Arizona	61	New Hampshire	36
Colorado*	60	America federal*	36
Maine	59	Nova Scotia	36
North Carolina	58	Wyoming	34
New Mexico	58	Germany	17
Rhode Island	58	EU Parliament	15

^a US states marked with asterisks represent jurisdictions where surveys were sent as discussed later; those without asterisks represent other states whose CPI scores are only reported.

Table 1 summarises our findings, illustrating the CPI scores for each of the jurisdictions in descending order. The scores for the US are taken from the CPI website, whereas all other scores were calculated by the research team.

Based on analysis of the table, at least three observations can be made. First, 50 per cent of the US observations have scores of 60 points or more, whereas the American federal legislation has a score below that of most states. Second, all Canadian observations have scores that hover between 35 and 50 points. Finally, the lowest jurisdictions are Germany and the European Parliament.

With Table 1 in mind, and given that it is useful to gain a theoretical understanding of the different sorts of regulatory systems, one can consider developing a theoretical classification of the different types of lobbying regulatory environments. Clearly, any classification scheme will be debated and challenged. But, the use of classification schemes, and the development of what Max Weber referred to as 'ideal types', where the ideal type is formed from characteristics and elements of the given phenomenon but is not meant to correspond to all of the characteristics of any one particular case, forms the basis for helping us

understand common trends as well as differences. We argue that there are three 'ideal types' of regulatory systems relative to each other: lowly regulated systems, medium regulated systems and highly regulated systems (Table 2).

The first type, *relatively lowly regulated systems*, corresponds to jurisdictions that attained CPI scores between 1 and 19, and refers to Germany and the European Parliament. Such systems entail the following qualitative characteristics. They have rules on individual registration, where lobbyists must register, but few details have to be given (such as in the case of the EP, where lobbyists do not have to state which subject matter/bill/institution they are lobbying). There are no rules on individual spending disclosure (lobbyists are not required to file spending reports) or an employer spending disclosure (lobbyists' employers are not required to file spending reports). There is a weak system of online registration. Lobbyists' lists are available to the public, but not all details are displayed. Finally, there is little enforcement capability, and no cooling-off period in the legislation, which means that legislators can register as lobbyists immediately after leaving office.

The second type, *medium regulated systems*, correspond to those jurisdictions that attained a CPI score between 20 and 59, and includes all the Canadian jurisdictions plus several American ones, including the federal level. In these systems the rules on individual registration are tighter than in lowly regulated systems. For instance, those registering must state the subject matter/bill/governmental institution being lobbied. Regulations exist surrounding individual spending disclosures, whereby gifts are prohibited, and all political contributions must be reported. Yet there are loopholes, such as free 'consultancy' by lobbyists to political parties. There are no regulations for employer spending reports, so a lobbyist's employer is not required to

file a spending report. There is a system of online registration, which in some cases, such as Ontario, is efficient and effective, requiring few resources to use and maintain. Public access to a lobbying register is available and updated at frequent intervals, although spending disclosures are not publicised. In theory, a state agency can conduct mandatory reviews and audits, although it is unlikely that the agency will prosecute violations of regulations, given its lack of resources and information. There is only one case of a prosecution in the whole of Canada, that being in Quebec in 2006. Finally, there is a cooling-off period before legislators, having left office, can register as lobbyists.

The final type, *relatively highly regulated systems*, entails jurisdictions that attained a CPI score of over 60 and under 100. This corresponds exclusively to 50 per cent of the American states, with the highest being Washington State. The rules on individual registration in these systems are the tightest of the three. For example, not only is the subject matter/institution required when registering, but also the lobbyist must state the name of all employers, notify almost immediately any changes in the registration, and provide a photograph. Tight individual spending disclosures are required, in stark contrast to both lowly and medium regulated systems. In this context a lobbyist must file a spending report, his or her salary must be reported, all spending must be accounted for and itemised, all people on whom money was spent must be identified, and all campaign spending must be accounted for. Employer spending disclosure is also tight. Unlike lowly regulated or medium regulated systems, an employer of a lobbyist is required to file a spending report and all salaries must be reported. A system for online registration exists, and public access to a lobbying registry, which is updated frequently, is available. This includes spending disclosures, which are available to the

Table 2: The three ideal types of regulatory systems

	Lowly regulated systems	Medium regulated systems	Highly regulated systems
Registration regulations	Rules on individual registration, but few details required	Rules on individual registration; more details required	Rules on individual registration are extremely rigorous
Spending disclosure	No rules on individual spending disclosure, or employer spending disclosure	Some regulations on individual spending disclosure; none on employer spending disclosure	Tight regulations on individual spending disclosure, and employer spending disclosure
Electronic filing	Weak online registration and paperwork required	Robust system for online registration; no paperwork necessary	Robust system for online registration; no paperwork necessary
Public access	List of lobbyists available, but not detailed, or updated frequently	List of lobbyists available; detailed, and updated frequently	List of lobbyists and their spending disclosures available; detailed, and updated frequently
Enforcement	Little enforcement capabilities invested in state agency	In theory, state agency possesses enforcement capabilities, though infrequently used	State agency can, and does, conduct mandatory reviews/ audits
Revolving door provision	No cooling-off period before former legislators can register as lobbyists	There is a cooling-off period before former legislators can register as lobbyists	There is a cooling-off period before former legislators can register as lobbyists

public, a provision not found in the other two systems. State agencies conduct mandatory reviews and audits, and there is a statutory penalty for late and incomplete filing of a lobbying registration form. Finally, there is a cooling-off period before legislators, having left office, can register as lobbyists.

Actors' opinions, and correlations with ideal types

To understand how effective the legislation has been, questionnaires were sent to lobby groups, politicians and public-sector administrators in the federal and provincial jurisdictions with lobbying legislation in Canada, including Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia; the federal level and a repre-

sentative sample of states in the US, including Washington, New York, California, Texas, Georgia, Colorado, Florida and Illinois; and actors working at both the federal German level and the EP. As Newfoundland only implemented legislation in late 2005, no surveys were sent out there. The total number of questionnaires sent out between October and December 2005 was 1,808, of which 1,225 were dispatched to lobbyists, 91 to public-sector administrators and 492 to politicians. Given that questionnaires sent by email generally yield a low response rate, the approach adopted here was to send hard copies by post. Taking all four political systems, a total of 140 questionnaires were completed: 6.5 per cent of all lobbyists, 19.8 per cent of all public-sector administrators and 8.7 per cent of all politicians responded. Several

respondents replied that although interested in the study, they were unable to, or did not want to, fill in the questionnaire. This can partly explain why response rates were not higher, especially for politicians. It reflects the fact that some felt the subject matter sensitive and did not want to state their positions (despite the guarantee of anonymity). Another factor impinging upon our response rate was that several respondents had moved, changed address, changed portfolios or, in the case of politicians, retired. When completing the questionnaire, respondents were also asked if they would be willing to partake in a follow-up interview. We held over 25 on-site interviews in Canada and the US, and several telephone interviews with officials in Brussels and Germany, between March and April 2006. Taking both the questionnaires and elite interviews, we consider the respondents' answers to the various questions, while attempting to see if there are correlations between the overall responses to questions and the ideal type of system from which respondents come. We recognise that, when compared to large-*N* studies, the numbers of respondents is relatively small, but, it was our intention to gain an indication of trends and relations, not to conduct a 'large-*N*' study per se.

One of the first questions asked if respondents considered themselves knowledgeable on the relevant legislation pertaining to regulation of lobbyists. Approximately 85 per cent of elected representatives and public-sector administrators considered themselves knowledgeable. Of all lobbyists, 77 per cent saw themselves as knowledgeable, with the only outlier being Germany, where almost half were neutral on the issue, and slightly more than 50 per cent did not consider themselves knowledgeable. To ascertain if there are correlations between answers to this question and our classification of 'ideal types' of systems discussed above (lowly, medium

and highly regulated), we first compressed all the responses from the question into the three categories, defined by CPI ranges of 0–19, 20–59 and 60–100. Then we carried out cross-tabulations: the Pearson chi-square test is a statistical method to examine the hypothesis that the CPI ranges and the answers to the questions are independent. The lower the significance value for a correlation, the less likely it is that the two variables are independent. In other words, the lower the score, the more likely they are to be related. With this test, a value of less than 0.05 is considered significant. When the cross-tabulations were completed, a correlation was found: actors in higher-regulated systems are more likely to strongly agree with the idea that they are more knowledgeable about the legislation. This makes intuitive sense, because if an actor is in an environment where there are more robust 'rules', he or she will be more likely to feel responsible to learn what these are. The opposite is also true, as reflected in the responses from lobbyists in Germany: the less robust the regulations, then the less likely it is that respondents would feel a responsibility to learn about the rules, as their impact is minimal in any case.

In another question, we sought to measure whether respondents felt that the overall regulations in their jurisdiction helped ensure accountability in government. Over 76 per cent of elected representatives felt that lobbying legislation helped ensure accountability, while this figure dropped to 71 per cent for lobbyists. Nevertheless, only 50 per cent of public-sector administrators felt that lobbying regulations ensured accountability. Regulators at the Canadian federal level represented an outlier, with none considering lobbying regulations as helping to ensure accountability. When performing the cross-tabulations, a correlation was found: actors in higher-regulated systems were more likely to

agree that the system ensures accountability. Again, this does make intuitive sense given that tighter regulatory systems promote accountability precisely because the rules are stronger. On the other hand, the weaker the regulations, the more likely it is that they will have less effect in promoting accountability.

Another question sought to measure whether respondents felt that having public access to an official list of lobbyists ensures accountability. The following answers were given across all four countries: almost 70 per cent of elected representatives, and 80 per cent of administrators, considered that public access to an official list of lobbyists ensured accountability. However, only 60 per cent of lobbyists regarded public access to an official list of lobbyists as ensuring accountability. There was a correlation here: respondents in higher-regulated systems were more likely to strongly agree that having an official list of lobbyists ensures accountability than those in lower-regulated systems. When cross-tabulations were run on whether there was a correlation between CPI scores and if public access to an official list of lobbyists was freely available, a correlation was found: higher-regulated systems guarantee public access and knowledge of who is lobbying the government. This indicates that higher-regulated systems foster transparency. Taking both observations together, one interpretation is that higher-regulated systems are more likely to have safeguards that ensure that a list of lobbyists is in place at all times, and is readily accessible to the public via the Internet.

When asked if reviews or audits of lobbyists by agencies are effective in ensuring accountability, almost 38 per cent of elected representatives were neutral on this question, while only 43 per cent regarded reviews or audits of lobbyists as effective in ensuring accountability. Over 58 per cent of public-sector administrators were neutral. Only about

40 per cent of lobby groups agreed that reviews or audits of lobbyists by agencies are effective in ensuring accountability. Lobbyists were more inclined than the other two groups to express neutral sentiments or disagree. Unlike the previous questions on accountability, there was no correlation: this suggests no relationship between the type of regulations in place and whether or not reviews or audits ensure accountability.

Beyond the above finding showing that higher regulatory systems promote transparency in the political process through ensuring that public lists of lobbying groups are freely available, another question sought to measure whether specific rules surrounding individual spending disclosures help ensure transparency. Over 93 per cent of elected representatives agreed, or strongly agreed, that specific rules surrounding individual spending disclosures help ensure transparency, while this number dropped to 65 per cent and 75 per cent for administrators and lobbyists respectively. No correlation was found between CPI scores and transparency with regard to individual disclosures: mostly, all respondents believed that individual spending disclosures promoted transparency. However, of all systems, only highly regulated ones have the strongest rules surrounding individual and employer spending disclosures, such as whether a lobbyist is required to file a spending report, if salaries are to be reported by lobbyists on spending reports, and whether the recipient of the expenditure is required to be identified. While this finding suggests that respondents from highly regulated systems are satisfied with regulations surrounding individual spending disclosures, the survey findings suggest one of two things for those respondents from lowly and medium regulated systems. Either they would not unreasonably want to see more rules surrounding individual spending disclosures forming part of their legislation, or

they like the idea 'in theory', but do not want to see it form a full part of their legislation.

An interesting finding relates to loopholes. We initially asked respondents whether they thought there were loopholes in the system that would allow individual lobbyists to give/receive 'gifts', regardless of the legislation in force. In Germany and the EP, 35 per cent of elected representatives agreed that there were loopholes in the system permitting lobbyists to give/receive 'gifts.' However, in American jurisdictions such as New York and California, the opposite was the case. Public-sector administrators tended to be more neutral or disagreed with this question (78 per cent). Only at the federal level in Canada did administrators believe that there were loopholes. In Germany, 58 per cent of lobbyists held that there were loopholes, while the remainder were neutral. In New York and California, lobbyists were much less likely to agree with the view that there were loopholes. A correlation found that the more lowly regulated the system, the more likely it was to be perceived to have loopholes. This again makes some intuitive sense: if there are tighter rules, it is less likely that you will find a 'loophole'. However, it is important to note that several of the interviewees mentioned the idea that 'regardless of the legislation in force, there were *always* ways of getting around it', even in highly regulated systems; or, as a Canadian interviewee put it, 'where there's a will, there's a way'. Even in Washington State, the highest regulated jurisdiction in the study, a CPI report in August 2005 found that the spirit of the state's exemplary disclosure law was being undermined by lobbyists who reported their clients' purposes on disclosure forms in vague terms. This view was reiterated by both lobbyists and regulators in interviews in Olympia, Washington State, in March 2006. A senior official of the Public Disclosure

Commission (PDC), in Washington State remarked that while the vast majority of lobbyists, and those they lobbied on behalf of, were happy to obey the rules, there were always a few who would try to flout them. If we take the case of Canada, legislation exists specifying that only \$1,000 can be given to any political party during a campaign. Ways of 'getting around this' include: free consultancy work by lobbyists for a political party during an election, with the view of attaining pay-offs if the party gets elected; or helping 'fund-raise' for a party by holding special private events (such as a fund-raising supper).

The problem of loopholes relates to the other problem of enforcement. Although there is little enforcement capability in lowly regulated systems, most legislation in highly and medium regulated systems encompasses a system of fines if, for example, a lobbyist has not registered. But, how effective are registrars in enforcing that lobbyists register in medium and highly regulated systems? When asked if they thought that there are lobby groups working that have not registered, Canadian regulators answered 'probably'. However, the following response by an interviewee in Canada illustrates the effectiveness of enforcement:

Some lobby groups are not registered because they are ignorant of the rules. Others, such as some lawyers, don't realise that they are lobbyists. If I receive a complaint from a third party, I investigate it . . . but I have usually found that 'human error' is the reason for not having registering . . . (there is no maliciousness). Registering helps increase the credibility and trust that citizens have in lobby groups and politicians alike.

A similar point was made in Washington State, where the PDC observed that much of the problem in relation to non-registration was human error and was not malicious. Those lobbyists who were acting in a malicious manner were quickly discovered and punished, as the

registration system has gained widespread credibility, and those who hire lobbyists demand that they are registered. Interestingly, many lobby groups register not only because it is required in certain jurisdictions, but also because it is good 'public relations', and in their 'self-interest'. As several lobbyists in medium and highly regulated systems mentioned, with the registration system they could illustrate to their members what their lobbying activities were at the local government level. Some lobbyists said that they registered to show other lobbyists and consultants what 'they were doing', or to show 'how successful they were in terms of the work that was being done'. From this perspective, enforcement is not a problem, as lobby groups strategically use the registry to legitimate what they are doing, and to get the 'message across' to citizens and competitors alike.

Conclusions

Despite the existing literature on lobbying, no study has offered a comparative analysis of developments in the four systems where lobbying legislations exists. Nor has there been a comparative study seeking to better understand politicians', lobbyists' and regulators' views of the regulations, and how these vary according to the specific regulatory environment. With this in mind, the article's first objective was employ a quantitative index to measure the strength of regulations in each of the four systems, which would allow for a classification scheme of the 'ideal' types of regulatory environments. The second objective was to gauge the opinion of political actors, interest groups and regulators in all four systems, and measure what correlations, if any, can be drawn between the different ideal types of systems and their opinions.

The first significant finding is that three ideal types of regulatory environment can be conceptualised with respect to

lobbying regulations, and that there is not simply one model per se. The first are lowly regulated systems, and the main conclusion drawn from them is that rules on individual lobbyists' registration exist, but few details beyond this are required. Moreover, while lobbying lists are available for public scrutiny, details such as spending reports are not. The political systems that fit within this ideal type are Germany and the European Union. By contrast, the main findings from medium regulated systems are that lobbyists must not only register, but must also state the institutional actors they are lobbying, and the subject matter on which they are lobbying. Some regulations exist surrounding individual spending disclosures, gifts are prohibited and all political contributions must be reported. However, there are no regulations for employers' spending reports, and lobbyists' spending disclosures are not available for public scrutiny. The systems within this ideal type include the federal levels in Canada and the United States, all Canadian provinces and several US states. In strongly regulated systems lobbyists must reveal their employers, the institutional actors they are lobbying and the subject matter on which they are lobbying. Rigorous individual spending disclosures are required of both lobbyists and their employers. Scrutiny of spending disclosures is open to the public, and regulatory transgressions are punishable by means of significant penalties. Fitting within this ideal type are half the American states.

The second significant finding relates to the opinions of agents involved in lobbying, including politicians, regulators and interest groups. Actors in highly regulated systems were more likely to agree, compared to actors in lowly regulated systems, that regulations help ensure accountability in government. In other words, the stronger the rules are, the more accountability is fostered in the political system. It was also found that

actors in higher regulated systems are more likely to strongly agree that they are knowledgeable about legislation. In this scenario, the tighter the rules are, the greater is the responsibility that actors feel to study them. Another finding was that the weaker the regulatory environment, the more likely respondents were to think that there were loopholes. Nevertheless, it was argued that even in relatively highly regulated systems, if there is a 'will' there is always a 'way' of undermining the regulations. From this perspective, while highly regulated systems help to ensure fewer loopholes, no ideal type is infallible.

While this study has been concerned with understanding lobbying regulations in four systems, the findings may offer two primary insights for states such as the UK that have considered regulating lobbying activity, but have yet to adopt such rules. The first is that there are *different ways* to regulate lobbyists. For example, the lowly regulated ideal system suggests that there is 'light' way of regulating, while the highly regulated system suggests there is 'heavy' way of so doing. Depending on what the objectives of the regulation are, states may implement different ideal types. The second insight is that the adoption of different ideal types will have different impacts. For example, if a highly regulated ideal type is implemented, this seems to foster accountability in the political system as well as promoting safeguards against different loopholes. Nevertheless, with regard to the latter point, this study has shown that lobbying legislation is no panacea: if lobbyists and politicians desire to pursue corrupt activities, no piece of legislation will prevent them from so doing. Yet, it may be argued that pursuit of lobbying rules may serve as a framework to establish a paradigm within which all policy-makers can effectively function. This paradigm ultimately promotes the long-term goals of accountability and transparency, while it poten-

tially serves as a deterrent, if not an antidote, for corrupt practices.

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Notes

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Appendix A

The CPI scores for Washington State (calculated by the Centre for Public Integrity), Canadian federal and Germany

Question	Washington State answers	Point value	Canadian federal answers	Point value	Germany answers	Point value
<i>Definition of lobbyist</i>						
1 In addition to legislative lobbyists, does the definition recognise executive branch lobbyists?	Yes	3	Yes	3	No	0
2 How much does an individual have to make/spend to qualify as a lobbyist or to prompt registration as a lobbyist, according to the definition?	Must register irrespective of how much made/spent	4	Must register irrespective of much money made/spent	4	Must register irrespective how much money made/spent	4
<i>Individual registration</i>						
3 Is a lobbyist required to file a registration form?	Yes	3	Yes	3	Yes	3
4 How many days can lobbying take place before registration is required?	Zero days	4	One to ten days	2	Sixteen or more days	0
5 Is the subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on the registration forms?	Subject matter only required	1	Bill number and subject matter	3	Subject matter only	1
6 How often is registration by a lobbyist required?	Every other year	1	Every six months	2	Every year	2
7 Within how many days must a lobbyist notify the oversight agency of changes in registration?	Six to ten days	2	Sixteen or more days	0	Sixteen or more days	0
8 Is a lobbyist required to submit a photograph with registration?	Yes	1	No	0	No	0

Question	Washington State answers	Point value	Canadian federal answers	Point value	Germany answers	Point value
9 Is a lobbyist required to identify by name each employer on the registration form?	Yes	1	Yes	1	Yes	1
10 Is a lobbyist required to clearly identify on the registration form any additional information about the type of his or her lobbying work (i.e. compensated or non-compensated/contract or salaried)?	Yes	1	Yes	1	Yes	1
<i>Individual spending disclosure</i>						
11 Is a lobbyist required to file a spending report?	Yes	3	No	0	No	0
12 How often during each two-year cycle is a lobbyist required to report spending?	Ten or more filings within two years	3	No	0	N/A	0
13 Is compensation/salary required to be reported by a lobbyist on spending reports?	Yes	2	No	0	No	0
14 Are summaries (totals) of spending classified by category types (i.e. gifts, entertainment, postage, etc.)?	Yes	2	No	0	No	0
15 What spending must be itemised?	All spending required to be itemised	4	No	0	N/A	0
16 Is the lobbyist employer/principal on whose behalf the itemised expenditure was made required to be identified?	Yes	1	No	0	N/A	0
17 Is the recipient of the itemised expenditure required to be identified?	Yes	1	No	0	No	0
18 Is the date of the itemised expenditure required to be reported?	Yes	1	No	0	No	0
19 Is a description of the itemised expenditure required to be reported?	Yes	1	No	0	No	0
20 Is the subject matter or bill number to be addressed by a lobbyist required on spending reports?	Subject matter only required	1	Bill number required	3	No	0

Question	Washington State answers	Point value	Canadian federal answers	Point value	Germany answers	Point value
21 Is spending on household members of public officials by a lobbyist required to be reported?	Yes	1	No	0	No	0
22 Is a lobbyist required to disclose direct business associations with public officials, candidates or members of their households?	No	0	No	0	No	0
23 What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving/reporting gifts?	Gifts are limited and reported	2	Gifts prohibited	3	None	0
24 What is the statutory provision for a lobbyist giving/reporting campaign contributions?	Lobbyist campaign contributions allowed and required to be disclosed on spending report/prohibited during session	1	All political contributions reported by recipient	1	None	0
25 Is a lobbyist who has done no spending during a filing period required to make a report of no activity?	Yes	1	No	0	No	0
<i>Employer spending disclosure</i>						
26 Is an employer/principal of a lobbyist required to file a spending report?	Yes	3	No	0	No	0
27 Is compensation/salary required to be reported on employer/principal spending reports?	Yes	2	No	0	No	0
<i>Electronic filing</i>						
28 Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with electronic/online registration?	Yes	1	Yes	1	No	0
29 Does the oversight agency provide lobbyists/employers with electronic/online spending reporting?	Yes	1	Yes	1	No	0
30 Does the oversight agency provide training about how to file registrations/spending reports electronically?	Yes	1	Yes	1	No	0

Question	Washington State answers	Point value	Canadian federal answers	Point value	Germany answers	Point value
<i>Public access</i>						
31 Location/format of registration or active lobbyist directory:	Searchable database on the Internet	3	Searchable database on the Internet	4	Yes	3
32 Location/format of spending reports:	Searchable database on the Internet	3	No	0	No	0
33 Cost of copies:	Less than 25 cents per page	1	\$1 per page	0	0	1
34 Are sample registration forms/spending reports available on the Internet?	Yes	1	No	0	No	0
35 Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by year?	Yes	2	No	0	No	0
36 Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by spending report deadlines?	Yes	2	No	0	No	0
37 Does the state agency provide an overall lobbying spending total by industries that lobbyists represent?	Yes	2	No	0	No	0
38 How often are lobby lists updated?	Daily	4	Daily	4	Annually	1
<i>Enforcement</i>						
39 Does the state have statutory auditing authority?	Yes	2	Yes	2	No	0
40 Does the state agency conduct mandatory reviews or audits?	Yes	2	Yes	2	No	0
41 Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby registration form?	Yes	1	Yes	1	No	0
42 Is there a statutory penalty for late filing of a lobby spending report?	Yes	1	No	0	No	0
43 When was a penalty for late filing of a lobby spending report last levied?	Up to one year	3	N/A	0	N/A	0
44 Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby registration form?	Yes	1	Yes	1	N/A	0
45 Is there a statutory penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby spending report?	Yes	1	N/A	0	No	0

Question	Washington State answers	Point value	Canadian federal answers	Point value	Germany answers	Point value
46 When was a penalty for incomplete filing of a lobby spending report last levied?	Up to one year/don't accept incomplete filings	3	N/A	0	N/A	0
47 Does the state publish a list of delinquent filers either on the Internet or in a printed document?	No	0	No	0	No	0
<i>Revolving door provision</i>						
48 Is there a 'cooling-off' period required before legislators can register as lobbyists?	Yes	2	Yes	2	N/A	0
Total number of points		87		45		17

Sources: <http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/nationwide.aspx?st=WA&Display=DrState>
Canadian federal and German legislation numbers are based on authors' analysis.